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THE WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PLANS
by !?lark S. Sniderman* A recent survey of and extension t o research on the topic of unemployment insurance (UI) by Tope1 and Welch (1980) focuses on the issue of UI financing.' In particular, following Becker (1972) , they a r e interested in the influence of the experience-rating provisions of the American UI system on a firm's layoff policy. They suggest t h a t a more complete model of both firms and workers would be a f r u i t f u l endeavor, and two e f f o r t s of t h i s type have been made by Azariadis (1979) and Brown (1980) .' This paper investigates a penumbral issue in the UI financing l i t e r a t u r e : the relationship between experience rating, public and private UI systems, and individual welfare. A public insurance system can never be perfectly experience-rated i f the government desires people w i t h different layoff probabilities to hold identical insurance policies. A corollary proposition i s that a private insurance system, i f information i s perfect, would always feature fully-rated plans, b u t the characteristics of these plans may frustrate other public policy transfer or maintenance).
ly a l l previous research points out the moral he UI system, there has been l i t t l e attention uced by government introduces t h i s issue irm i s tantamount to the firm t o the vagaries of the business cycle.
*Mark Sniderman i s an economic advisor, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. The author wishes to thank Douglas Hough for helpful comments.
Firms may be willing t o bear t h i s exposure when UI i s part of an impliclt labor contract with i t s employees, and employees likewise may be willing to pay f o r the risk shifting through wage adjustments (Azariadis (1975) , Baily (1977a Baily ( ), (1977b . However, for some firms, the degree of exposure necessary t o insure a l l workers legally may contribute to insolvency. Incomplete experience rating i s one method of achieving risk-pooling among firms and limits the exposure of high-turnover firms. Incomplete experience rating i s a form of market intervention by government for the benefit of high risk firms and employees. Incomplete experience rating i s controversial where UI i s concerned,in part because of the adverse incentives i t provides firms and employees. A great deal i s known about the distribution of the turnover risk ex ante than i s the case in many other insurance markets. For example, Munts and Asher (1980) show that construction, manufacturing, and agriculture a r e most likely t o be subsidized and t h a t trade, finance, insurance, and real estate are most often the subsidizing industries.
Part I . Basic Model
The basic model follows the one developed f o r competitive insurance markets by Rothschild and S t i g l i t z (1976) . An individual has an income of W i f he i s f u l l y employed f o r some period, and an income of W-d i f he suffers a layoff.3 The individual can insure himself against t h i s layoff by paying a premium a, t o an insurance I company, in return for which a net benefit of a3 i s paid in the event of layoff. The vector a = ( a l , a 2 ) denotes the insurance contract.
Preferences f o r income in the two s t a t e s of nature a r e given by the the expected u t i l i t y function:
where U(.) describes preferences f o r money income, W1 = W -a l , ( n e t income), W2 = W -d + a2 ( n e t income), and p i s the layoff probability. All individuals a r e identical except f o r t h e i r layoff probabilities, and a l l a r e r i s k averse (U" < 0 ) . Contracts a r e sold by risk-neutral, expected-profit-maximizing insurance companies.
Mhen contract a i s sold t o an individual with layoff probability p, the contract i s worth:
t o the individual and, ( 3 n(a, P ) = (1 -p)al -P a2
t o the insurance company. Free entry and perfect competition require zero expected profits. In equilibrium, individuals have complete insurance ( i .e. , they expect the same income whether l a i d off or not) purchased a t actuarial odds. In contrast w i t h Rothschild and S t i g l i t z , I am interested in examining an insurance market in which the accident (layoff) proba b i l i t i e s are known by customers, insurance companies, and the government. In the case of UI, this point of view i s legitimate. F i r s t , the moral hazard f o r the employee to extend his unemployment spell i s not being considered here, so only the occurrence of a layoff is important. Furthermore, the employment and layoff policies of f i r y s tend t o be related more t o industry type and size than t o other variables, and information of t h i s type i s easy t o obtain. 8
Fi nal ly , going concerns have a known track record regarding t u r novers that result in UI benefits paid. Future layoffs cannot be perfectly predicted, of course, b u t relative layoff rates among firms are likely to be f a i r l y constant over time. Over short periods of time, the actual layoff rates for high-and low-risk firms may differ H from p and p L , b u t over more lengthy periods (such as several years) the distributions of layoff rates are assumed t o have means H L of p and p . The variances of these firm layoff rates are important, and they will be discussed more fully in Part 11.
The two contracts a and 6 (in Figure 1) Various i n t e r e s t groups were interested in different goals; some wanted high benefits, others wanted limited l i a b i l i t y , others wanted one national plan. Disagreement over the form of UI insurance to be established by s t a t e governments in the 1920s could be construed as disagreement over whether S or 4 was the better social policy.
Policies of type S, i t was argued, encouraged employers t o reduce layoffs (in e f f e c t , pivoting the EH l i n e up toward the EL l i n e ) .
Other s t a t e s argued f o r pooling plans l i k e 4 on the grounds that S did n o t represent true insurance. 2) whether such a UI plan i s true insurance (guarantees stipulated benefits) or i s a reserve fund t h a t pays out until i t i s depleted.
15
The equilibrium plans S and 4 i n Figure 2 a r e both true insurance plans i f the diversifiability of the layoff risks i s sufficient to guarantee solvency of the insurer. In actual practice, neither one may be viable. The policies a and T may be marketed by different insurance companies. Since information i s perfect, s e l fselection i s not an issue. B u t the market f o r one of these policies may be too t h i n to guarantee solvency f o r the insuring company. 16
Similarly, @ may not prove t o be a solvent policy ex post; a firm can s e l l Q in the ex ante correct (zero-expected p r o f i t ) r a t i o between the two risk c l a s s e s and s t i l l have a d e f i c i e n t number ,of policyholders (and/or d e f i c i e n t c a p i t a l ) t o guarantee solvency.
The d i v e r s i f i a b i l i t y of the layoff risks i s , of course, not related t o the government requirement t h a t a l l UI plans pay identical bevefits to a l l policyholders. This problem would e x i s t in completely unregulated markets. However, i t i s unlikely t h a t s t a t e governments would permit undercapitalized underwriters t o operate within t h e i r
borders .I7 Private insurers may perceive the 1 imi t s of diversificat i o n , even where reinsurance i s possible, as preventing t h e i r participation i n any UI market, even i f benefit payments a r e very low. However, governments could guarantee "thick" markets, f o r example,by assigning a s u f f i c i e n t number of diverse policyholders t o each insurer so t h a t the probability of inso!vency would be considerably reduced. In the 1 irni t , t h i s law-of-large-numbers approach might iniuly a monopoly insurance system, public o r private. A public monoooly UI system provides governments with the opportunity t o s e t Senef i t 1 eve1 s , tax r a t e s , and e l i gi bi 1 i t y requi rements in accordance w i t h other public goals. Governments may choose t o o f f e r S or + as the compulsory UI system. Theycould a l s o e l e c t t o earn negative--expected p r o f i t s by transferring income from general tax receipts to UI recipients.
The current UI program in the United States operates as a transfer system i n ways other than inter-industry t r a n s f e r s . Covered Though economically justifiable, these differences may be d i f f i c u l t to defend pol i tical ly. Yet, once governments attempt t o provide "adequate" benef i t s , or "proportional " benefits , perfect experience rating must be replaced by some pooled-equilibria-contracting pattern.
A monopoly UI system based on pooling (imperfect experience rating) forces some people t o purchase less than optimal insurance coverage, while others may purchase more than i s optimal.
FOOTNOTES (cont ' ) 9. James (1947) 
10.
Under the Wisconsin plan, each employer's l i a b i l i t y was limited t o the reserves s e t aside in a fund. There was no guaranteed minimum benefit. This plan was decried as not being t r u e insurance. Some s t a t e s , such as Ohio, believed t h a t minimum benefits could be guaranteed by pooling plans. For a more general description of the h i s t o r i c a l and l e g i s l a t i v e history of UI, see Nelson (1969) and Haber and Murray (1966) .
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This i s l i k e l y t o be desirable from the employees' viewpoint, because the firm has comparative advantages i n these practices.
Furthermore, firms can diversify more completely than employees.
14. Tope1 and Welch (1980) 18. There i s not much evidence on t h i s point. The range of benefit maxima in s t a t e UI programs (50 to 79 percent of average wages) suggests t h a t an intra-program transfer exists. B u t taxes are collected on only the f i r s t $6,000 of each employees 1 earnings, suggesting a higher tax incidence on low-income workers. Of course, the tax exemption of UI benefits means that high-income beneficiaries require fewer before-tax dollars than low-income beneficiaries t o be on equal footing a f t e r tax. Feldstein (1974) reports that the distribution of benefits i s similar to the distribution of income for the general population. On t h i s basis, he argues that the poor do not benefit much from UI.
M y interest i s only in transfers among covered workers.
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Practical matters, however, apart from an income -transfer motive, might lead to an insurance system with the ex post characteristic of income transfer. These practical considerations include employer and employee moral hazards and imply coinsurance for certain groups of people.
20.
Assuming, of course, that the entire UI program i s &sisned to be ac tuarial ly sound.
